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Although COVID-19 has caused severe suffering globally, the efficacy of nonpharmaceutical
interventions has been greater than typical models have predicted. Meanwhile, evidence is mounting
that the pandemic is characterized by superspreading. Capturing this phenomenon theoretically requires
modeling at the scale of individuals. Using a mathematical model, we show that superspreading drastically
enhances mitigations which reduce the overall personal contact number and that social clustering increases
this effect.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.126.118301
During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, news stories
have frequently appeared detailing spectacular events
where single individuals—so-called superspreaders—have
infected a large number of people within a short time frame
[1–3]. By now, there is substantial evidence that these are
not just singular events but that they reflect a marked
transmission heterogeneity [4–6], a signature feature of the
disease. In a well-mixed population, such heterogeneity has
little bearing on the trajectory of an epidemic, but, when
public sphere contacts are restricted, heterogeneity takes on
a decisive role, as shown in Ref. [7]. In this Letter, we
investigate the effects of transmission heterogeneity—i.e.,
superspreading—on mitigation strategies which rely on a
general reduction in social network size and probe the
influence of social clustering on such interventions.
The origins of superspreading can be diverse, depending
on the characteristics of the pathogen in question.
Superspreading events may occur due to circumstances
and behavior as well as biology. Even medical procedures,
such as intubation and bronchoscopy, which facilitate the
production of aerosols [8], can lead to superspreading
events in respiratory diseases. However, the most straight-
forward model of superspreading is that some individuals
simply shed the virus to a much greater extent than the
average infected person. For COVID-19, this ”biological
superspreader” phenomenon has some traction and is
supported by the observation that household transmission
is limited, despite the relatively high average infectiousness
of COVID-19 [9–11].
Superspreading is not a phenomenon which is particular
to SARS-CoV-2 but has been observed in connection with
several other pathogens, including coronaviruses such as
SARS [12,13] and MERS [14], as well as in diseases such
as measles [15] and Ebola virus disease [16,17]. Pandemic
influenzas such as the 1918 Spanish flu, on the other hand,
are believed to be far more “democratic” [18]. The
heterogeneity of transmission is usually quantified using
the Gamma distribution [15]. This is the origin of the
dispersion parameter or k value, which determines
the fraction of infectious individuals who account for the
majority of infections (Fig. 1). Smaller k means greater
heterogeneity—in fact, when k is small (jkj ≪ 1), it
approximates the fraction of infected individuals who give
rise to 80% of infections. For COVID-19, which is believed
to have a k value of perhaps 0.1 [4–6], the most infectious
10% of individuals thus cause approximately 80% of
infections.
The fundamental difference between a homogeneously
spreading disease and a highly heterogeneous one is
reflected in the infection networks they give rise to, as
visualized in Fig. 1. When only a small fraction of
individuals cause the bulk of infections, a reduction in
social network connectivity amounts to decreasing the
likelihood that a superspreader infects another super-
spreader and thus propagates the disease. Consequently,
in a network characterized by superspreading [Fig. 1(a)],
the outbreak can be stopped by cutting only a few select
edges. Not so for the network in Fig. 1(c).
In this Letter, we present a model of superspreading
phenomena which assumes that the driving force is a
biological heterogeneity in infectiousness. We implement
this as an agent-based model with contact networks and are
also able to capture much of the phenomenology in
analytical formulas. In the model, N agents are placed
as the nodes in a contact network. We investigate different
types of network, but our base case is the Erdös-Renyi
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network, which is characterized by a Poisson degree
distribution and an absence of clustering.
At initialization, the infectiousness of each individual is
drawn from a Gamma distribution [15]. As such, it is an
innate property of each individual. The possible states of
each individual are susceptible, exposed, infected, and
recovered (for details, see Supplemental Material [19],
which includes Refs. [20–27]). At each time step, each
individual randomly selects one of its contacts to interact
with, meaning that only a subset of the network is active at
any given time. While a link between an infectious and a
susceptible individual is active, there is a constant prob-
ability of infection per unit of time, as determined by the
individual infectiousness.
This basic setup also lends itself to analytic calcula-
tions, as long as saturation effects can be ignored.
Consider a single infected person who has c contacts,
who are all assumed susceptible. First, the infectiousness r
of the individual is drawn from a gamma distribution
PIðrÞ with dispersion parameter k and mean μ. The
distribution of the reproductive number R of an individual
with a known infectiousness r and degree (i.e., connec-
tivity) c is given by





ð1 − e−r=cÞRðe−r=cÞðc−RÞ: ð1Þ
Taking the variability in infectiousness into account, the





drPIðrÞPðR; r; cÞ: ð2Þ
In the limit of infinite connectivity, corresponding to a
well-mixed population, this becomes a negative binomial
distribution. That particular case has been studied in
Ref. [15]. Given a contact network and a corresponding
degree distribution PCðcÞ—for example, a Poisson dis-
tribution in the case of an Erdös-Renyi network—
the connectivities can be summed over to yield a
distribution of individual reproductive numbers, PðRÞ ¼P
c PCðcÞPðR; cÞ.
As reflected in the equations above, the actual number of
secondary infections depends not only on biological
infectiousness. In Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), we use this analytical
framework to explore how the number of personal contacts
affects the resultant distribution of infections. Without
superspreading [Fig. 2(a)], a reduction in the contact
number has a very modest effect and the distributions
overlap. When the heterogeneity is at a COVID-like level
[Fig. 2(b)], it is quite a different story. Here, a decrease in
mean connectivity has a considerable effect, and mitigation
suddenly looks feasible. Previously, another mitigation
strategy which benefits from superspreading was suggested
by Ref. [15], with the crucial difference that it relies on
prior identification and targeting of superspreaders, in
contrast to the broad reduction in mean connectivity
explored here.
To quantify the sensitivity of the epidemic to social
network size, we consider the basic reproductive number
FIG. 1. The characteristics of superspreading. (a) Simulated infection network characterized by superspreading, with a dispersion
parameter k ¼ 0.1, within what has been observed for COVID-19 [4,5]. Superspreaders appear as hubs, while most individuals are
“dead ends,”meaning that they do not transmit the disease. The epidemic mainly grows by spreading from one superspreader to the next.
(b) The dispersion parameter k provides a measure of superspreading, with lower k values corresponding to a greater heterogeneity. With
a k value of 0.1 for COVID-19, approximately 10% of the population has the infectiousness to cause 80% of transmission. SARS and
MERS are also characterized by a significant heterogeneity [14,15], while pandemic influenza is believed to be more homogeneous [18].
(c) Simulated infection network without superspreading (all individuals have equal infectiousness). Here, most individuals spread the
disease to a few others, leading to a branched structure.
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R0, meaning the average number of infections that each
infected person causes in a situation where all contacts are
still susceptible. In Fig. 2(c), the R0 is given as a function of
the dispersion parameter k and the average contact number.
The epidemic is evidently much more sensitive to reduc-
tions in contact numbers when the transmission hetero-
geneity is high. A mitigation in which the average number
of contacts goes from being unrestricted, down to about 10,
causes a reduction in R0 which lowers both the peak and
total number of persons infected during the course of the
epidemic (the attack rate). The overall trajectory of a
homogeneous disease is largely unaffected by social con-
nectivity [Fig. 3(a)], whereas a heterogeneous epidemic is
very sensitive [Fig. 3(b)]. We find a particularly large
sensitivity to a reduction of contact number from 15 down
to 10 [Fig. 3(b)], indicating a critical threshold for disease
spreading, in line with the threshold indicated by the
dashed curve in Fig. 2(c).
Crucially, a reduction in contact time is not necessary
when the disease is characterized by superspreading. What
counts is rather a reduction in contact diversity, meaning the
number of different persons with whom you come into
contact during the time you are infectious [7]. This differs
fundamentally from SIR models, where contact time and
diversity are not differentiated between [28]. In our model,
a reduction in the size of an individual’s social circle is not
accompanied by a reduction in contact time, since the same
number of contact events is maintained, with each remain-
ing person being contacted more often. Thus, a mildly
infectious individual will not experience appreciable sat-
uration by a reduction in contact diversity, whereas a
superspreader will be highly limited by the resultant local
saturation.
So far, our analysis has been based on the Erdös-
Renyi network, which is largely devoid of clusters.
This was chosen as a clean setting in which to probe
how social connectivity affects superspreading. However,
any realistic social network will involve clusters of
people who know each other [29–31]—after all, your
colleagues know each other as well as knowing you. It
is thus natural to ask whether such cliquishness impacts
superspreading. In Fig. 4, we compare a cluster-free net-
work to one characterized by a high degree of clustering
[32]. See Supplemental Material [19] for the algorithm used
to generate this network.
The attack rate of the disease is clearly lowered by
clustering, in general (Fig. 4), but the effect is especially
significant when heterogeneity is high. The mechanism
behind this is that of local saturation. If a superspreader
(a) (b)
FIG. 3. The epidemic trajectory of a heterogeneous disease is
highly sensitive to mitigation. Epidemic trajectories as a function
of the number of people that each person interacts with during an
infectious period. (a) Time evolution in the absence of any
infection heterogeneity. (b) Time evolution for a disease





FIG. 2. The reproductive number. Distributions of individual
reproductive number R and value of R0 for different dispersion
parameters and number of social contacts during an infectious
period. This figure is based on the analytical framework described
in the main text. See Supplemental Material [19] for details on the
calculation. (a) Distribution of R for a disease where all
individuals have equal infectiousness. (b) Distribution of R for
a disease characterized by superspreading (dispersion parameter
k ¼ 0.1). (c) Basic reproductive number R0 as a function of social
connectivity and dispersion. The dashed line represents R0 ¼ 1.
These calculations take into account the Poisson distributed
contact number and the fact that each infectious person will
have one insusceptible person in their network (the individual
from whom the infection originated), even when computing the
basic reproductive number. Details on an analytic computation of
R0 for fixed (δ-distributed) contact number can be found in
Supplemental Material [19].
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infects a significant portion of his network, there is a risk
that one of these individuals will turn out to be another
superspreader. However, if there is clustering, a large part of
this second superspreader’s network will already have been
exposed, and the second superspreader does comparatively
little harm.
In the literature, there exists ample evidence that social
heterogeneity, implemented either through wide distribu-
tions of social activity [28] or through social networks with
broad degree distributions [23–26], has a significant effect
on the course of an epidemic. Notably, epidemics tend to
attain lower final sizes in networks with broad degree
distributions [23,24,26,33,34] and in clustered networks
[26]. While the effects of varying degree distributions as
well as clustering were explored in Ref. [26], mitigation by
contact network reduction was not investigated, and no
variation in individual infectiousness was assumed. As we
have shown, the effects of biological superspreading on
mitigation are profound in networks with a representative
mean. In Supplemental Material [19], we simulate an
epidemic on a much more socially heterogeneous (fat-
tailed) network based on data from Ref. [27] and find that
our conclusions are robust to alterations in the degree
distribution.
Beyond the mitigation strategies discussed here, which
rely on broad reductions in contact numbers, more targeted
strategies are possible—most prominently, test-trace-
isolate (TTI) strategies. While an in-depth treatment of
the implications of superspreading for TTI strategies is
beyond the scope of this Letter, our simulations do imply
that backward contact tracing (see, e.g., [35]) is more
effective in the presence of superspreading. When encoun-
tering an infected individual, this strategy relies on asking
“Who was this person infected by, and who else might that
person have infected?” rather than simply asking “Who
might this person have infected?,” as one would in forward
tracing schemes. We can estimate the efficacy of backward
tracing in our simulations by measuring how many sec-
ondary cases each infected person allows one to trace, with
and without superspreading. In a well-mixed scenario, we
find the answer to be 2.7 without superspreading (k ¼ ∞)
and 24 with COVID-like superspreading (k ¼ 0.1). Of
course, such a backward contact tracing scheme may run
into practical limitations, especially regarding the temporal
constraints arising from a disease with a relatively short
generation time. Nevertheless, these results seem to indi-
cate that transmission heterogeneity may profoundly in-
fluence TTI mitigation strategies as well.
Superspreading is now a well-established phenomenon
for a number of diseases [15], including COVID-19 [4,5].
In spite of this, the extent to which circumstance and
person-specific properties contribute to the observed over-
dispersion in COVID-19 is still not clear. Superspreading
can also have a social component, exemplified by highly
social individuals, who come into contact with a large
number of people in a limited time frame. However, such
individuals would also be superreceivers, a trait which
impacts the epidemic even in the absence of mitigation
[36,37]. In any case, ability as well as opportunity is
necessary for superspreading to occur. In our model, we
have focused on interindividual variation in ability to
produce and transmit virus. This simplification is supported
by cases of one person infecting many people at different
times and locations [38] and by the observation that most
infected people do not even infect their spouse [9–11].
However, more complex models could incorporate realistic
social heterogeneity as well as large temporal variations in
viral load [39,40]—effects which we have not probed.
Furthermore, studies which address event-driven super-
spreading as well as contact tracing in the presence of
superspreaders are also needed.
Regardless of the origin of superspreading, we empha-
size the particular fragility of a disease in which a major
part of infections are caused by the minority. If this is the
case, the disease is vulnerable to mitigation by reducing the
number of different people that an individual meets within
an infectious period. The significance is clear: Everybody
can still be socially active but generally only with relatively
few—on the order of ten persons. Importantly, our study
further demonstrates that repeated contact with intercon-
nected groups (such as at a workplace or in friend groups) is
(a)
(b)
FIG. 4. Final attack rate (total fraction of the population
infected) as a function of network connectivity and transmission
heterogeneity. In (a), we investigate an Erdös-Renyi network,
with the same degree distribution as in Fig. 2. (b) explores a
network where each person is assigned to two groups of people,
leading to a highly clustered network. The black regions indicate
conditions where the disease cannot spread in the population. On
the right-hand side, small fragments of the networks in question
are shown. Each of the two contour plots in this figure are based
on 1500 runs of the model. A detailed description of the
algorithm used to generate the clustered network is included
in Supplemental Material [19].
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comparatively less damaging than repeated contacts with
independent people.
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